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U.K.

IAC-M-268 27 November 1956

### INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held in IAC Conference Room, Administration Building, Central Intelligence Agency, at 1045, 27 November 1956

> Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell Presiding

#### MEMBERS PRESENT

- Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
- Major General Robert A. Schow, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
- Rear Admiral Laurence H. Frost, \* Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
- Captain William S. Howell, \* acting for Director of Naval Intelligence,
  Department of the Navy
- Major General Millard Lewis, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
- Brigadier General Richard Collins, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
- Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative to the IAC
- Mr. Ralph R. Roach, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation representative to the IAC

<sup>\*</sup>Part of meeting

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#### 1. Approval of Minutes

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25X1 25X1 a. 13 November Meeting (IAC-M-266)

b. 16 November Meeting (IAC-M-267)

Approved as written.

- No. 328 and No. 329
  - a. Noted these reports.
- b. General Cabell referred to his recommendation, after the Suez invasion, that, with respect to the Middle East situation, the Watch Committee should concentrate particularly on evidence, if any, of Soviet involvement (IAC-M-263, 30 October 1956, item 8 d). Noting that, as events moved on, emphasis had shifted more toward rear areas where danger spots had arisen, General Cabell proposed, and the members concurred, that the Watch Committee should devote special attention to the Syrian, Jordanian and Israeli situations, as well as to developments bearing on possible Soviet Bloc involvement in the Middle East. In the course of the discussion, Admiral Frost suggested that Watch Committee reports clearly reflect the fact that the Watch Committee was thus broadening its coverage of Middle Eastern developments.

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#### 3. <u>Initiation of SNIE on Impact</u> of Middle East Situation

- a. An Air Force memorandum was distributed to the members which recommended initiation of a special national intelligence estimate, designed to examine the economic, financial, industrial, political and military impact of the current Middle Eastern situation on Western Europe. Mr. Kent raised the question of whether such a paper should be broadened to include the impact on areas other than Western Europe. The members then discussed generally such problems as those of timing, content and any necessary assumptions. Reference was also made to a recent CIA survey of studies related to the current petroleum situation in Western Europe, which indicated that much information bearing on such matters was already available from various government and non-government sources.
- b. Following their exchange of views, the members agreed that the Board of National Estimates should draft, on a priority basis, terms of reference envisioning a paper along the lines of, but broader in scope than that proposed by the Air Force. These terms of reference would be discussed by the Board and IAC representatives and a final recommendation made with respect to whether the final paper should be done in one or more installments. It was also agreed that a copy of the CIA survey of studies related to the current petroleum situation in Western Europe should be attached to and distributed with the terms of reference.
- 4. Probable Soviet Actions
  in the Middle East
  (SNIE 11-10-56)

Referring to a CIA paper on "Probable Soviet Actions in the Middle East," dated 26 November, which had been circulated to the members prior to the meeting in the form of a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, with a view to its expeditious coordination as a special national intelligence estimate, the Chairman inquired whether the members wished to complete action at this meeting or defer their decision until the paper had been coordinated

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by the IAC representatives. Following discussion, the members agreed to proceed with the paper as an SNIE but to postpone final action pending consideration by the IAC representatives. Noting the desire of Mr. Dulles that the paper be cleared as soon as possible, Mr. Kent suggested, and the members concurred, that the IAC representatives should begin considering the draft on Tuesday afternoon. The Chairman expressed the hope that the paper could be cleared by the members without the necessity of a special IAC meeting later in the week.

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7. SNIE 12-3-56
Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations

a. In opening the discussion, Mr. Smith noted that it was not intended that this estimate should take the place of the longer Satellite paper, which was still scheduled for production later (NIE 12-57). The members then exchanged views on SNIE 12-3-56 and approved this estimate, as amended.

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### 8. GMIC Communication

General Cabell read to the members a communication addressed to the Chairman, IAC, dated 13 November, in which the Chairman, GMIC, referred to a section of SNIE 11-9-56 which addressed itself specifically to the subject of Soviet guided missile capabilities, and reaffirmed GMIC's readiness to support the IAC in all matters in consonance with its terms of reference. After inviting comments by the members, General Cabell stated that, with respect to the preparation of SNIE 11-9-56, there had been no intent to overlook or by-pass GMIC. He noted also that in this case the Board of National Estimates had been required to produce on extremely short notice a draft estimate for submission to a special night session of the IAC. In this connection, Mr. Kent pointed out that the principal emphasis of the paper had been on Soviet political intentions rather than on the more technical aspects of Soviet guided missile or military capabilities.

#### 9. Executive Session

At 1235 the Chairman requested the members to remain for an executive session.

Adjournment: 1250

Acting Secretary